A case-control study to identify risk factors associated with avian influenza subtype H9N2 on commercial poultry farms in Pakistan by Chaudhry, Mamoona et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A case-control study to identify risk factors associated with
avian influenza subtype H9N2 on commercial poultry farms in
Pakistan
Citation for published version:
Chaudhry, M, Rashid, H, Thrusfield, M, Welburn, S & Bronsvoort, M 2015, 'A case-control study to identify
risk factors associated with avian influenza subtype H9N2 on commercial poultry farms in Pakistan' PLoS
One, vol. 10, no. 3, e119019. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0119019
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1371/journal.pone.0119019
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
PLoS One
Publisher Rights Statement:
Copyright: © 2015 Chaudhry et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author and source are credited
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
RESEARCH ARTICLE
A Case-Control Study to Identify Risk Factors
Associated with Avian Influenza Subtype
H9N2 on Commercial Poultry Farms in
Pakistan
Mamoona Chaudhry1*, Hamad B. Rashid2, Michael Thrusfield3, SueWelburn1, Barend
MdeC. Bronsvoort4
1 Division of Infection and Pathway Medicine, The University of Edinburgh Medical School, Edinburgh,
Scotland, United Kingdom, 2 Department of Clinical Medicine and Surgery, University of Veterinary and
Animal Sciences, Abdul Qadir Jilani Road, Lahore, Pakistan, 3 The Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary
Studies, The University of Edinburgh, Easter Bush, Roslin, Midlothian, Edinburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom,
4 The University of Edinburgh, Roslin Institute at the R(D)SVS, Easter Bush, Roslin, Midlothian, Edinburgh,
Scotland, United Kingdom
* mamoona.chaudhry@gmail.com
Abstract
A 1:1 matched case-control study was conducted to identify risk factors for avian influenza
subtype H9N2 infection on commercial poultry farms in 16 districts of Punjab, and 1 admin-
istrative unit of Pakistan. One hundred and thirty-three laboratory confirmed positive case
farms were matched on the date of sample submission with 133 negative control farms. The
association between a series of farm-level characteristics and the presence or absence of
H9N2 was assessed by univariable analysis. Characteristics associated with H9N2 risk that
passed the initial screening were included in a multivariable conditional logistic regression
model. Manual and automated approaches were used, which produced similar models. Key
risk factors from all approaches included selling of eggs/birds directly to live bird retail stalls,
being near case/infected farms, a previous history of infectious bursal disease (IBD) on the
farm and having cover on the water storage tanks. The findings of current study are in line
with results of many other studies conducted in various countries to identify similar risk fac-
tors for AI subtype H9N2 infection. Enhancing protective measures and controlling risks
identified in this study could reduce spread of AI subtype H9N2 and other AI viruses be-
tween poultry farms in Pakistan.
Introduction
Avian influenza virus (AIV) A subtype H9N2 has become prevalent in domestic poultry in
many countries in Asia and The Middle East since the late 1990’s [1]. Outbreaks of AIV sub-
type H9N2 in commercial chickens have been reported in Iran (1998), Pakistan (1998), China
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(1994), Korea (1996), United Arab Emirates (2000–2003), Israel (2000–2006), Jordan (2003),
Lebanon (2004), and Iraq (2004–2007) [2, 3].
According to FAO [4] there are four sectors of poultry production systems (i.e Industrial in-
tegrated system with high levels of biosecurity; commercial poultry production system with
moderate to high biosecurity; commercial poultry production system with low to minimal bio-
security; and village or backyard production system with minimal biosecurity). Pakistan has all
four sectors of poultry production system as mentioned above. In Pakistan, poultry production
contributes 35% of livestock production and it has become the second largest industry after
cotton, with an annual turnover of US$ 2 billion. The poultry sector has proved to be one of
the most vibrant segments of the agriculture sector in Pakistan. Directly and indirectly, 1.5 mil-
lion people are estimated to have benefitted from this sector in terms of employment and in-
come [5].
Avian influenza outbreaks have a devastating impact on these commercial poultry sectors in
Pakistan and many outbreaks of AIV e.g. subtype H7N3 (three outbreaks in 1995, 1998, 2001–
2002), H5N1 (three outbreaks, 2006–2008), and H9N2 (first time reported in 1998, since then
it has become endemic in the country) have been reported in Pakistan [6–9]. Despite the en-
demicity and losses in the poultry sector from avian influenza, particularly subtype H9N2,
there is little information on risk factors for outbreaks or the use of biosecurity measures by
poultry farmers in Pakistan.
Identification and quantification of locally important risk factors associated with infected
farms is a critically important step in the development of risk-based surveillance and control
strategies. Many published articles have quantified different risk factors for various subtypes of
avian influenza in commercial poultry farms all over the world [10–23]. Previously published
studies have demonstrated that avian influenza introduction, transmission and persistence are
associated with poultry trading pattern [12, 20], human and poultry densities [18, 23], move-
ment of human and fomites [10, 12, 14], low biosecurity [10, 13, 21, 22], proximity to water
bodies [15, 16, 17, 23], distance from other commercial poultry farms [11, 13, 21], and proxim-
ity to roads [15, 16, 19]. These risk factors help to further identify high-risk farms/systems,
which could be targeted for interventions such as vaccination or culling. Removal of identified
risk factors plays an important role in the control of disease burden. However, no work has
been done to quantify risk factors associated with infection of AIV in commercial poultry sec-
tor of Pakistan using analytical epidemiological techniques. Knowledge of the epidemiology of
AIV (especially H9N2) in Pakistan is also inadequate. Bearing in mind the importance of poul-
try production system in Pakistan, which provides a good source of protein, and importance of
the epidemiology of avian influenza in birds, a major threat for veterinary and public health,
the following study was designed to identify and quantify risk factors associated with the pres-
ence of AIV subtype H9N2 on commercial poultry farms of Pakistan. These findings may also
provide insight into the mechanism of spread of AIV subtype H9N2 in Asia.
Materials and Methods
Study Design
The eligible population was commercial poultry farms producing poultry/products for com-
mercial market and consumption in Pakistan and source population of this study consisted of
all types of poultry raising premises in 16 districts of the Punjab and 1 administrative unit i.e.
Capital city of Pakistan. The final study population was commercial poultry farms submitting
samples for laboratory analysis to the collaborating commercial laboratory from these areas.
There were approximately 19,713 broiler farms and 3,599 layer farms in the study area [24]. A
matched, 1:1, case-control design was used. A case farm was defined as a commercial poultry
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farm, which had submitted samples (lung, intestine, trachea) to the laboratory for diagnosis of
H9N2 between May 2009 and January 2010 and which were confirmed as positive through
virus isolation and sub-typed as H9N2 by hemagglutination inhibition test (HI). Routine mon-
itoring of flocks at commercial farm is conducted by the flock managers. Daily record of disease
data i.e. morbidity and mortality is maintained at farm level. When a farm manager suspects
any sign of influenza like illness in the flock, samples are immediately dispatched to the com-
mercial or public laboratories for post mortem examination or further laboratory investiga-
tions. The laboratory investigations in the current study were carried out by a private
laboratory providing diagnostic services to commercial poultry farmers. The samples were ini-
tially screened by postmortem examination of dead birds. Positive samples were further pro-
cessed by virus isolation and subtyping by hemagglutination inhibition test. Laboratory
provided the data on request of the research team. A control farm was defined as any commer-
cial farm, which submitted samples (feces/blood) to the same laboratory for diagnosis of para-
sitic diseases (the other major diagnostic category requested other than for AI) and were
matched to cases based on month of submission. Control farms needed to have the potential to
be cases so only farms submitting samples were considered for controls on the assumption that
given they were prepared to submit samples they would be more likely to participate in the
study. Our other intention here was to select for controls a group of farms where the mangers
of the flock on those farms had a relatively good understanding of disease. Due to availability
of limited funds to confirm the negative status of each control (which would have required
large within flock samples) and instead the clinical records of the flock were relied upon. Based
on the flock history, lack of clinical signs of influenza or influenza like infections and an aver-
age flock mortality of less than 3%, commercial farm was considered as not likely to have cur-
rent AIV infection and retained as a control farm.
To achieve 80% power to detect an odds ratio of>2.0 with 95% confidence interval, assum-
ing 40% exposure in the controls, 133 case farms and 133 control farms were required based on
WINPEPI 8.7 [25, 26].
There was no requirement for ethical review to collect questionnaire-based data about man-
agement of commercial poultry flock in Pakistan. Permission was sought from the local Veteri-
nary Officers (VOs) to contact selected owners. Owners were then contacted initially by mobile
phone and the project objectives explained and they were then asked to participate in the
study. If they agreed the farm was visited, a structured interview using a standardized question-
naire tool was conducted to gather information on risk factors.
The address of each farm was obtained from the logbook of the laboratory. The 266 selected
farms were visited between May 2009 and January 2010 and structured questionnaire complet-
ed with the owner/farm manager at a face-to-face interview with the field team (MC and
HBR). The questionnaire included 37 risk factors about farm management, biosecurity mea-
sures, location of farm, and flock history (S1 Appendix). The risk factors were selected after ex-
tensive review of published articles and knowledge of the local farming practices [10–23, 27–
38]. The study was carried out for approximately 8 months. More then 80% of the case farms
were visited within a month of the date of diagnosis, as they were located in the vicinity districts
of the capital of Punjab. Approximately 20% farms were visited over a month from the date of
diagnosis due to their remote location.
The location of each farm was recorded with a hand-held Global Positioning system (GPS,
Garmin, Olathe, KS, USA) in WGS-84 datum. Maps were generated in ArcGIS 10 (Geographi-
cal Information System, ESRI System, Redlands, CA, USA). Geographical data of Pakistan
boundaries, administrative division and other shape files were downloaded from the internet
(http://www.diva-gis.org/datadown and http://www.mapcruzin.com/free-pakistan-arcgis-
maps-shapefiles.htm).
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Statistical Analysis
Questionnaires were entered into EpiData software 3.1 (www.epidata.dk/download.php). Data
were validated by crosschecking all the computerized records with the original hard copy of
complete data. Statistical analysis was conducted using the R statistical software [39].
Several continuous variables relating to distances from roads or other farms were changed
to binary variables to avoid problems of linearity. Boundaries for the categorization were cho-
sen on the basis of predefined categories for the variables [40]. The predefined categories were
based on knowledge about those variables from review of available literature and any threshold
values given in the literature was chosen to define the categories e.g. distance from the main
road (in km) was divided into two categories i.e.0.5 km and>0.5 km, distance from the
nearest commercial farm and distance from the nearest case/infected farm were categorized
into1 km and> 1 km [21, 22, 41–43]. Age at the time of submission of sample to the labora-
tory was also categorized into50 days or>50 days because difference in age is related to im-
mune response of the birds and its susceptibility to avian influenza [44, 45]. Categorical
variables with more than 2 levels were included using dummy variables. A dummy variable ad-
justment method was adopted to deal with missing data on predictor variables in regression
analysis [46, 47]. For each predictor with missing data, a dummy/indicator variable was created
to indicate whether or not data are missing on that predictor. All such dummy/indicator vari-
ables were included as predictor in regression. Those dummy/indicator variables were coded
with a constant value for missing data. For the construction of dummy/indicator variable
“Nested IF function in Excel” was used. It was coded as “1” if the value was missing and “2” if
the answer was “No” and “3” if the answer was “Yes”.
All biologically plausible and relevant variables from the questionnaire were screened using
the clogit function of the survival package (version 2.37–7), which effectively performs a Man-
tel-Haenszel matched-pair analysis [48]. Using the standard screening approach suggested by
Hosmer and Lemeshow [49] variables with a Wald statistic p-value of< 0.25 were passed on
from the univariable analysis for use in development of the multivariable model. This subset of
variables was then checked for colinearity using Spearman rank correlation using the cor func-
tion. Strongly correlated groups of variables that were also biologically related were collapsed
into a new single variable for use in the final model selection process using principle compo-
nent analysis (function princomp) and kmeans (function kmeans) clustering to identify two
clusters based on these.
Multivariable models were developed using a backward manual stepwise elimination process
[50] removing the one with the largest p-value respectively. If a variable was no longer statistically
significant after adjustment for other variables it was removed (p-value = 0.05). Variables were re-
tained or removed from the model after considering theWald Statistic (or log likelihood ratio test
for categorical variables with 3 or more levels) with a p-value of 0.05. The presence of confound-
ing in the data was assessed by monitoring the estimated coefficient values and checking that they
did not change by more than 10% when statistically non-significant variables were dropped from
the model [49, 50]. The models derived manually were compared to those from the automated
model selection procedure in the function stepAIC in theMASS package in R, which use Akaike’s
information criterion [51] to trade of goodness-of-fit against model complexity.
Results
A total of 133 case farms and matched controls were identified, contacted and visited in the
study area. Their positions are marked on the map in Fig. 1 and shows that case farms were
mostly concentrated near Lahore district followed by Kasur district. The control farms were
mostly situated near Okara and Gujranwala districts though there was overlap.
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A total of 34 variables were screened in the univariable analysis and 25 were associated with
being a case or control (Table 1). Among these, 14 factors were found to be associated with an
increase in the odds of exposure in case farms compared to control farms and included; dis-
tance from the main road of0.5 km, distance from the nearest commercial farm of1 km,
distance from the nearest case/infected farm of1 km, age of flock at the time of submission of
samples to laboratory, presence of pond/canal/water reservoir near the farm wild/migratory
birds coming on the pond/canal/water reservoir, history of infection with IBD in the same
flock, infection with Escherichia coli in the flock, sharing of farm equipment, raising backyard
poultry/pet birds on the farm premises, selling of eggs/birds directly to live bird retail stalls,
selling of culled birds directly to live bird retail stalls and cover on the water storage tank.
Twelve factors were found to be protective i.e. having smaller odds of exposure among farms
with AI subtype H9N2 infection as compared to controls.
The collinearity between these variables was assessed and plotted (S1 Fig. Correlation plot
for all variables that passed the initial univariable screening). There was clearly considerable
collinearity between a number of variables, all related to biosecurity/disease management.
Using PCA and kmeans clustering, 12 of the variables (Farm fully fenced, disinfection of area
around sheds, sharing farm equipment, footbath/dipping areas on the farm, worker changed
boot, worker changed cloths, visitors changed boot, ventilation system, floor cover type, drink-
ing water system, disposal of dead birds) were collapsed into a new variable named ‘biosecurity’
that was used in the final modeling to replace all these correlated variables.
An initial model built using backward elimination is given in Table 2. Four variables re-
mained in the model, which were, being less than 1 km from a case/infected farm; being less
than 1 km from other nearest commercial poultry farm; having a history of IBD on the farm
and selling eggs directly to live bird retail stalls. Biologically these are all plausible. This model
was compared with one generated by the automated stepwise AIC procedure which produced
a similar but more complex model which substituted IBD with type of shed, having cover on
water storage tank and biosecurity (details not shown). However, the OR and 95% confidence
intervals of the distance to the nearest case/infected farm were both extremely large and wide.
This is partly because, not surprisingly, being near an case/infected farm is highly risky and
Fig 1. Spatial distribution of case and control farms in different districts of Pakistan, sampled
betweenMay 2009 and January 2010.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119019.g001
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Table 1. Result of univariable analysis by Mantel-Haenszel matched pair analysis of the possible risk factors associated with the risk of AIV
H9N2 infection among commercial poultry farms.
Variable Variable level Case (n = 133) Control (n = 133) M-H Odds Ratio
(OR) and 95% CI
p-value*
Distance from the main road 0.5 km 128 118 3.50 (1.15–10.6) 0.027
>0.5 km 5 15 1
Distance from the nearest commercial farm 1 km 85 48 1.80 (1.04–3.12) 0.035
>1 km 69 64 1
Distance to the other case/infected farm 1 km 99 14 29.3 (9.28–92.7) <0.001
>1 km 34 119 1
Pond/canal/water reservoir near the farm Yes 128 116 7.00 (1.59–30.8) 0.010
No 5 17 1
Wild/migratory birds coming on the pond/canal/
water reservoir
No water
reservoir
5 17 1
Yes 126 114 7.00 (1.59–36.8) 0.01
No 2 2 7.00 (0.60–81.7) 0.12
Farm fully fenced Yes 96 115 0.41 (0.21–0.77) 0.006
No 37 18 1
Age of ﬂock at the time of submission of samples 50 days 44 27 2.13 (1.16–3.94) 0.015
>50 days 89 106 1
History of Infectious Bursal Disease in the ﬂock Yes 96 57 3.05 (1.82–5.13) <0.001
No 37 76 1
Infection with Escherichia coli in the ﬂock Yes 113 100 1.86 (0.95–3.49) 0.051
No 20 33 1
Disinfection of areas around sheds Yes 64 87 0.39 (0.22–0.72) 0.002
No 69 46 1
Sharing of farm equipment Yes 15 6 2.50 (0.97–6.44) 0.057
No 118 127 1
Raising backyard/pet birds on farm premises Yes 25 4 8.00 (2.91–26.4) <0.001
No 108 129 1
Selling of birds/eggs directly to the live bird retail
stalls
Yes 49 12 7.16 (3.05–16.8) <0.001
No 84 121 1
Selling of culled birds directly to live bird retail shop Yes 30 15 2.87 (1.29–6.43) 0.010
No 103 118 1
Dipping area/footbath at the farm entrance Yes 31 49 0.49 (0.27–0.87) 0.014
No 102 84 1
Worker change/disinfect boots Yes 53 78 0.42 (0.24–0.73) 0.002
No 80 55 1
Worker changed cloths Yes 40 71 0.33 (0.18–0.58) <0.001
No 93 62 1
Visitor change/disinfect boots Yes 56 77 0.50 (0.30–0.84) 0.009
No 77 56 1
Cover on the water tank reservoir No water tank 5 5 1
Yes 89 125 0.83 (0.23–3.02) 0.778
No 39 3 10.8 (1.95–60.5) 0.006
Disposal of dead birds Properly 38 59 0.43 (0.24–0.78) 0.005
Not properly 95 74 1
Type of Shed Open sheds 73 44 1
(Continued)
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strongly associated such that when the 2x2 table for the matched data was examined, there
were only 3 discordant case control pairs in one cell which makes precision of the estimate dif-
ficult to achieve.
In order to check the impact of this variable, we dropped it and reran a backward model
and a new model (Model 2) was developed (Table 3). Interestingly although the variable ‘hav-
ing cover for water storage tanks’ does not appear significant based on the Wald statistic p-
value, dropping it seems to have a large impact on the fit based on the R2 decreasing. This was
checked by running an automated model selection algorithm based on the AIC which
Table 1. (Continued)
Variable Variable level Case (n = 133) Control (n = 133) M-H Odds Ratio
(OR) and 95% CI
p-value*
Window- less 53 74 0.35 (0.19–0.66) 0.011
Semi-window-
less
7 15 0.30 (0.12–0.81) 0.016
Ventilation system Fan ventilated 60 90 0.33 (0.19–0.60) <0.001
Naturally 73 43 1
Drinking water system Automated 54 74 0.46 (0.26–0.82) 0.008
Manual 79 59 1
Feeding system Automated 46 69 0.48 (0.28–0.81) 0.006
Manual 87 64 1
Floor cover type Concrete 71 47 0.42 (0.24–0.73) 0.002
Saw dust 62 86 1
*P-value based on Wald statistic
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119019.t001
Table 2. Model 1— Risk factors associated with Avian Inﬂuenza type H9N2 infection on commercial poultry farms in Pakistan based on a
backward manual stepwise selection process on all variables available in Table 1.
Potential risk factors Response levels Regression coefﬁcient Standard error OR 95% CI for OR p-value
Distance from the nearest commercial farm >1km 1
1km -1.3082 0.6068 0.270a 0.082–0.888 0.031
Distance from the nearest case/infected farm >1km 1
1km 3.7927 0.7690 44.4b 9.83–200 <0.001
History of Infectious Bursal Disease in the ﬂock No 1
Yes 1.1753 0.4701 3.20c 1.29–8.14 0.012
Selling of birds/eggs directly to the live bird retail
stalls
No 1
Yes 2.0397 0.6828 7.69d 2.02–29.3 0.002
R2 = 0.365 (out of a possible 0.5)
aThe odds of being near the other commercial farm<1km was 0.270 (CI 95%: 0.082–0.888) times less in case farm than the odds of exposure in the
control farms
b The odds of being near the case/other infected farm<1km was 44.4 (CI 95%: 9.83–200) times greater than the odds of exposure in the control farms.
cThe odds of having history of infection with IBD for case was 3.20 (95% CI: 1.29–8.14) times greater than the odds of exposure in the control farm.
dThe odds of selling the birds/and or eggs directly to live bird retail shops was 7.69 (CI 95%: 2.02–29.3) times more than the odds of exposure in the
control farms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119019.t002
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produced the same model. A manual forward selection process produced a slightly simpler
model with just the IBD and selling eggs to live bird stalls staying in the final model (not
shown).
Discussion
Model selection is not a precise science as there is no one “true” model and different ap-
proaches/algorithms will give different models. Although automated approaches from machine
learning theory are increasingly being used in epidemiology, they have the disadvantages that
they cannot deal with subtleties of variable quality and tend to over fit to a given dataset mak-
ing generalization difficult. The researcher is therefore left to look at as many modeling ap-
proaches as possible and distill the complexity to identify the core variables. The analysis
presented in this study suggests regardless of the modeling approach that selling birds to live
bird retail stalls is strongly associated with an increased risk of AIV H2N9 on the farm. Fur-
thermore, previous history of IBD also came through in the models, as did having cover for
water storage tanks. Distance to a case/infected farm, other commercial farms or the main road
appears to all have some potential association, as does biosecurity.
Selling of eggs or birds directly to live bird retail stalls appeared to be strongly associated
(OR = 9.76; model 1) with an increased risk of AI in the current analysis. When farmers sell
their products to live bird retail markets, the stall owner either picks the birds, or farm vehicles
deliver the products to retail stalls. The movement of individuals and vehicles between farms
and markets might spread the virus mechanically.
A farm having a previous history of infection with IBD was more likely to become infected
with AI (OR = 3.2; model 1). There is very little information available about the potential ef-
fects of previous exposure to IBD virus and the subsequent susceptibility to AIV infection and/
Table 3. Model 2— Risk factors associated with Avian Inﬂuenza type H9N2 infection on commercial poultry farms in Pakistan based on a
backward manual stepwise selection process on all variables available in Table 1 except distance to the nearest case farm.
Potential risk factors Levels Regression coefﬁcient Standard error Odds ratios 95% CI for OR p-value
Distance from the main road >0.5km 1
0.5km 1.5244 0.7328 4.59a 1.09–19.3 0.038
Cover on the water tank No water
tank
1
No cover 0.8490 0.9830 2.34 0.34–16.1 0.388
Yes cover -1.1604 0.7767 0.3130 b*¶ 0.068–1.44 0.135
History of Infectious Bursal Disease in the ﬂock No 1
Yes 1.0979 0.3741 3.00c 1.44–6.24 0.003
Selling of birds/eggs directly to the live bird retail
stalls
No 1
Yes 2.3598 0.5847 10.6d 3.37–33.3 <0.001
R2 = 0.235 (out of possible 0.5)
aThe odds of having the distance from the main road <0.5km was 4.59 (CI 95%: 1.09–19.3) times higher than the odds of exposure in the control farms.
b*¶Non signiﬁcant protective factor, i.e odds of having cover on the water storage tank on case farm was 0.313 (CI 95%: 0.068–1.44) times less than the
odds of having cover on the water storage tank on control farms.
cThe odds of having history of infection with IBD for case was 3.00 (95% CI: 1.44–6.24) times greater than the odds of exposure in the control farm.
dThe odds of selling the birds/and or eggs directly to live bird retail shops was 10.6 (CI 95%: 3.37–33.3) times more than the odds of exposure in the
control farms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119019.t003
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or associated clinical signs, lesions, and virus shedding. Ramirez-Nieto et al. [35] have reported
the results of their experiment, which clearly indicate that prior exposure to IBD virus may in-
crease the chances of AIV infection in chicken. They demonstrated that pre-existing condi-
tions, such as exposure to IBD virus, contribute to the mechanism of adaptation and
generation of AIV strains with altered host range, tissue tropism, or virulence. They recom-
mended that the predisposing factors, such as IBD virus infection, should be considered
amongst the risk factors for the emergence of AIVs with increased pathogenic potential.
Having cover on the water storage tank though was not strongly associated with a decrease
in the risk of AI (OR = 0.313; p>0.05). The presence of a cover on a water tank is thought to
prevent the transmission of AI virus, which might occur when droppings and other excretions
of wild birds contaminate the water tank used for housed poultry.
Distance of the poultry farm to a main road of0.5 km may increase the risk of AI subtype
H9N2 infection. Many studies have been conducted [15,16, 19], which demonstrated that
proximity to major roads was associated with avian influenza.
Short buffer distance between farms elevates poultry density within a given radius and
could enhance the risk of spread of avian influenza [21]. The multivariable analysis in the cur-
rent study suggests that the risk of AI subtype H9N2 infections was not increased with decreas-
ing distance to the nearest commercial farm or increasing poultry density, which is usually
speculated. There may be other factors, such as climate factors or biosecurity levels on farms,
which influenced the spread of the virus and reduced the likelihood of becoming infected
based on only the distance from the infected farms or contaminated places. Distance to the
nearest case/infected farm of1 km was strongly associated with an increased risk of AIV.
Causally this factor plays an important role in the spread of infection, both as windborne
spread, if the distance between farms is less than 50 meters [27] and mechanical transfer by
other routes e.g. human movement between farms [13]. The large effect size and the wide CIs
were a concern for this variable, not because the association may not be true, but because of the
effect on the model and the estimation process where there are cells with small numbers of ob-
servations affecting precision.
Ponds, canals or water reservoirs can play an important role in the introduction of AI be-
cause these attract wild birds [16, 23], which may then contaminate the environment [17, 28].
Further wild birds may directly contaminate poultry sheds if they have access, acting as me-
chanical and/or biological vectors (shedding the virus in droppings) and are important particu-
larly for introducing virus to new areas [23, 28]. There were problems with collinarity with
presence of pond/canals/water reservoirs near farm and wild birds coming to that pond and so
these two variables were tried in separate modeling runs but neither stayed in any of the
final models.
A number of variables related to biosecurity measures were collapsed using PCA and
kmeans clustering. Good biosecurity measures such as a farm fence which can keep wild and
stray dogs, cats, foxes, pigs and other wild animals away from the susceptible birds and prevent
mechanical transmission [29–31] and potentially limit contact with wild birds [28, 32]; use of
footbath/disinfectant; workers changed/disinfected boots before entering the sheds; worker
changed cloths before entering the sheds; visitor changed/disinfected boots before entering the
sheds; presence of dipping area/footbath at the entrance of farm and sharing equipment were
all associated with AIV even after collapsing into a single variable. The main visitors who en-
tered the farm areas are farm services crews (debeaking staff, vaccination crew, bird catchers,
veterinarian, farm consultant and owner of the farms) [13, 21]. Similarly in Pakistan, poultry
farmers who apply strict biosecurity measures sometimes relax these rules for visitors, who
enter the bird areas. However, biosecurity variable was only retained in the more complex
model based on AIC (not shown).
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Age of flock (in days) at the time of submission of samples to the laboratory was considered
a potential confounder as clearly older flocks have had more time to be exposed and although
it showed a positive association with AIV infection in the univariable analysis, was non-
significant in the final model. Increase in age, increases the susceptibility of birds (due to hous-
ing stresses and the associated negative effects on immune status) and increases the opportuni-
ty for virus exposure [34].
E. coli has been observed to aggravate the clinical condition of birds earlier infected with
AIV subtype H9N2 [52], however in the current study a history of infection with E. coli in the
flock was not associated with an increased risk of AI infection.
A number of other management factors reported in other studies were also examined in the
current study including the proper disposal of dead birds [10, 21], trucks/vehicles entering the
farm premises [36], the presence of automatic fan ventilation system [10], the presence of ro-
dents in the sheds and keeping backyard poultry on the same premises [37, 38]. Although sev-
eral of these were associated with AI subtype H9N2 infection in the univariable analysis, none
were retained in the final model. Epidemiological tracing has shown that vehicles visiting farm
premises for different purposes are one of the routes of introduction of virus [36]. Capua et al.
[53] have also reported an association between the spread of AI virus and different type of vehi-
cles visiting the farms (e.g., feed trucks and abattoir delivery etc., which frequently visit a num-
ber of farms daily, regardless of the species reared and of the type of production).
Limitations of the Study
There was no complete database of poultry farms in Pakistan and cases and controls were se-
lected from the logbook of a local commercial laboratory. Selection bias due to non-random
sampling could occur because most of the farms were physically close to this laboratory and
were frequently submitting their samples for diagnostic purposes and had higher probabilities
of being selected as cases or control. Also it is possible that the better managed farms were
biasly selected because they were more likely to be investigating disease problems and this may
impact the study ability to identify management risk factors. The number of farms, which were
situated several miles away from the laboratory, was high but very few of them submitted sam-
ples for diagnostic purposes due to long distance between farm and laboratory. Due to this rea-
son they were under represented in the data set. This could lead to healthcare access bias as
only those farms were submitting samples that have easy access to laboratory.
The control farms were selected on the basis of absence of clinical signs of influenza on the
day of selection. However, the likelihood of a previous episode of disease could not be estab-
lished with certainty with this criterion, this could serve as a possible source of selection bias in
the study. Ideally flocks would have been confirmed negative by diagnostic tests. but resources
were not available to do this in this setting. Due to these selection biases the exposure effect
may be underestimated or overestimated.
In addition, respondents may have interpreted some questions subjectively. For example,
when the respondents of the farms were asked the question “Have you seen wild birds inside
the shed”, most of them may have interpreted it as visual confirmation of the presence of wild
bird inside the shed and because some of them who did not see wild birds inside the shed them-
selves, may have answered “No” to this question. The same applies to the question relating to
the presence of rodents inside the shed. Most of the respondents answered this question on the
basis of personal evidence of seeing rodents inside the shed. Similarly when they were asked
that if they have seen wild/migratory birds coming to the nearby pond/water body, some re-
spondents were confused by the type or species of bird; for example, some of them considered
crow as wild bird and replied “Yes”, to the question while in other instances, some respondent
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didn’t consider crow as a wild bird and replied “No” to this question. The questions could have
been worded more precisely to avoid these confusions. Some respondents also tried to hide or
gave misleading information, for example when they were asked, “Do they cover the water stor-
age tanks”. They might have considered that just putting a half cover on the tank is sufficient
and replied, “Yes”, while in some cases practically there was no complete cover on the tanks. In
some instances the response might have been influenced by recall bias of the respondent.
Conclusions
The aim of this study was to identify potential risk factors and quantify their association with
the presence of low pathogenic AI subtype H9N2 among commercial poultry farms in Paki-
stan. The current study has identified a set of similar risk factors to those identified in other
studies from other countries e.g. USA, China, Japan, Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Thai-
land and Pakistan, which shows that these well-known factors are mainly responsible for in-
creasing risk of AIV infection. Control of these risk factors could possibly reduce the risk of
AIV infection in commercial poultry farms in Pakistan and in other developing countries, par-
ticularly in South Asia. Particular attention is needed for the control of risk factors that are re-
lated to movement of humans. Good management practices and strict biosecurity rules
together can prevent the entry of infection to farms and transmission within sheds on a farm.
Some examples of these practices include banning the sale of eggs/birds directly to retail stalls,
increasing the distance between two commercial farms (more than 1 km), and covering water
sources to prevent wild bird access. Proper vaccination against IBD is also important for the
better control of diseases like AIV.
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